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ECAUSE 2004 was not a legislative year, there were no statutory
changes in the Texas Uniform Commercial Code ("Code") during
the Survey period.' There were, however, some significant cases
decided under Chapters 2 and 3 of the Code dealing with the sale of
goods and negotiable instruments, respectively. In addition, several other
cases were decided that clarify or affirm the interpretation of the Code in
a variety of contexts. Because the Code is also a (more or less) uniform
law, this Survey discusses some legislative action in other jurisdictions of
* Professor of Law and Foundation Professor of Commercial Law, Texas Tech Uni-
versity. B.A., J.D., University of Iowa; LL.M., Harvard University.
1. The Texas enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code is contained in the first
eleven chapters of the Texas Business and Commerce Code ("Code"). See TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.108 (Vernon 1994, 2002 & Supp. 2004). These chapters are
designated as follows:
Chapter 1: General Provisions
Chapter 2: Sales
Chapter 2A: Leases
Chapter 3: Negotiable Instruments
Chapter 4: Bank Deposits and Collections
Chapter 4A: Funds Transfers
Chapter 5: Letters of Credit
Chapter 7: Warehouse Receipts, Bills of Lading and Other Documents of Title
Chapter 8: Investment Securities
Chapter 9: Secured Transactions; Sales of Accounts and Chattel Paper
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interest to Texas practitioners. This article follows the usual format of
discussing these decisions and developments in the same order as that of
the Code itself.
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
Last year's Survey noted that, as of January 2004, only Texas, Virginia,
and the Virgin Islands had adopted revised Article 1 of the Code. 2 In
both Texas and Virginia, the legislatures rejected the liberalized choice of
law rules contained in the proposed Official Text of revised section 1-301
and retained the "reasonable relationship" test provided in the former
Official Text of section 1-105. 3 Only the Virgin Islands adopted the re-
vised choice of law rules.4
As of January 2005, five more states enacted revised Article 1 and all of
them have also rejected the revised choice of law rules in favor of retain-
ing the rules contained in the former section 1-105. 5 With this evident
resistance to the revised choice of law rules, it would not be surprising to
find the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
revisiting these rules with an eye toward retaining the former rules in an
attempt to speed up the adoption process.6
II. SALE OF GOODS
A. SCOPE OF CHAPTER 2
Section 2.102 of the Code provides that Chapter 2 applies to "transac-
tions in goods."'7 "Goods" are separately defined in section 2.105 to in-
clude specially manufactured goods and growing crops. 8 In Propulsion
2. John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 57 SMU L. REV. 699, 700 (2004) [herein-
after Commercial Transactions-2004].
3. The differences between the choice of law rules in the former section 1-105 and the
revised section 1-301 are described in Commercial Transactions-2004, at 700-01.
4. See Commercial Transactions-2004, supra note 2, at 700.
5. See ALA. CODE § 7-1-301 (Supp. 2005); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1-301 (Supp.
2005); HAW. REV. STAT. § 490:1-301 (Supp. 2005); IDAHO CODE § 28-1-301 (Michie Supp.
2005); and MINN. STAT. ANN. § 336.1-301 (West Supp. 2005). In all of the enacting jurisdic-
tions, the choice of law rules have been renumbered to conform to their designation as
section 1-301 in the Official Text, but the content is derived from the former section 1-105.
6. As compared to the adoption of the 1999 revision of Article 9 of the Code by all
fifty states within a three year period, the adoption of the 2002 revision of Article 1 has
been moving very slowly. A summary of the adoptions of Article 9 may be found in UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE REPORTING SERVICE: STATE VARIATIONS, Table of Enactments
of 1999 Amendments (Revised Article 9) xxv.
7. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.102 (Vernon 1994). This section excludes any
transaction that is in the form of a sale of goods, but that is intended to operate as a
secured transaction. Secured transactions are governed by Chapter 9 of the Code. See
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.109 (Vernon 2002). Section 2.102 also provides that
nothing in Chapter 2 impairs or repeals "any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers
or other specified classes of buyers."
8. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.105(a) (Vernon 1994) provides, "'Goods'
means all things (including specially manufactured goods) which are moveable at the time
of identification to the contract for sale other than the money in which the price is to be
paid, investment securities (Chapter 8) and things in action. § 2.105(a). 'Goods' also in-
cludes the unborn young of animals and growing crops and other identified things attached
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Technologies, Inc. v. Attwood Corp.,9 a contract called for a seller to pro-
duce boat propeller castings for a buyer. The seller was to manufacture
the castings according to specifications provided by the buyer. A dispute
eventually developed about whether the seller had misappropriated the
buyer's trade secrets during the course of manufacturing the castings. In
the buyer's action against the seller, a major issue was whether the con-
tract was for the sale of goods or for the provisions of services. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that this was an issue of contract interpre-
tation to be decided as a matter of law and not a question of fact for the
jury.10 On this basis, the court reviewed several cases addressing hybrid
contracts containing both sale and service elements. Noting that manufac-
turing always involves a service element, and that Chapter 2 includes
"specially manufactured goods" within its scope, the court held that the
predominant purpose of the contract was the sale of goods.1 1 The court
distinguished several cases involving hybrid contracts where the service
element was found to predominate on the ground that those cases in-
volved installation or construction to be performed by the seller after de-
livery of the goods. 12 In the case at bar, the seller was not required to
perform any services after the castings were delivered. The buyer argued
that the castings, as delivered, were in rough, unfinished form and re-
quired finishing by the buyer before use. The court pointed out that addi-
tional work provided by the buyer was irrelevant in determining whether
this was a sales or a services contract.
13
Because the contract was within the scope of Chapter 2, the court next
turned to the question of enforceability under the Chapter 2 Statute of
Frauds. 14 Although a writing did exist describing the transaction between
the parties, it did not contain a quantity term and merely stated that the
seller was "to establish minimum order requirements ... on an annual
basis" that were suitable to both the buyer and the seller. The court did
not regard this as a sufficient statement of a quantity term to satisfy the
to realty as described in the section on goods to be severed from realty (section 2.107)."
Id.
9. 369 F.3d 896 (5th Cir. 2004).
10. Id. at 906.
11. Id. at 901.
12. Id. at 902. The court identified the following cases as being in this category:
Ranger Constr. Co. v. Dixie Floor Co., Inc., 433 F. Supp. 442, 445 (D.C.S.C. 1977) (contract
to install flooring); Cacace v. Morcaldi, 435 A.2d 1035, 1038 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1981) (con-
tract to complete a chimney); Gulash v. Stylarama, Inc., 364 A.2d 1221, 1223 (Conn. C.P.
1975); Peltz Constr. Co. v. Dunham, 436 N.E.2d 892, 894 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982) (contract to
install drainage system); Ben Constr. Corp. v. Ventre, 23 A.D.2d 44 (N.Y. 1965) (contracts
to install or construct swimming pool); G-W-L v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex.
1982) (contract to build house); Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. v. Dalton, 665 S.W.2d 507,
511 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1983, no writ) (contract to shingle roof). Propulsion Techs., Inc.,
369 F.3d at 902.
13. Id. at 905. On this point, the court noted that, "When a materialman delivers
materials to be incorporated or constructed by a buyer or general contractor, the things are
'goods' sold; services to be provided later by others are not even considered in that deter-
mination." Propulsion Techs., Inc., 369 F.3d at 903.
14. Id. at 904. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.201 (Vernon 1994) provides that
contracts for the sale of goods for a price greater than $500.00 must be in writing.
2005]
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Statute of Frauds and the contract was, therefore, unenforceable. Judg-
ment in favor of the buyer was reversed and a judgment was rendered in
favor of the seller.15
McManus-Wyatt Produce Co. v. Texas Department of Agriculture Pro-
duce Recovery Fund Board16 also involved the scope of Chapter 2, this
time with regard to the sale of growing crops, but in a unique context.
The contract called for the seller to grow carrots for sale to the buyer at a
fixed price per ton. The seller was responsible for growing the carrots and
the buyer was to provide labor and equipment for harvesting. After some
carrots were harvested, the buyer refused to harvest the remainder of the
crop on the ground that the carrots did not meet the size and grade speci-
fications of the contract. The seller contended that the contract required
the buyer to complete harvesting. The seller filed a complaint with the
Texas Department of Agriculture Produce Recovery Fund Board("Board").' 7 The buyer filed suit in the State District Court of Hidalgo
County and requested a jury trial. The Board eventually awarded dam-
ages in favor of the seller. The buyer then filed suit in the Travis County
district court challenging the authority of the Board to make such an
award on the ground that the buyer had been deprived of the right to ajury trial. The Travis County District Court affirmed the decision of the
Board and the buyer appealed. 18
Upon reviewing the administrative procedure applicable to proceed-
ings before the Board, the Austin Court of Appeals held that the buyer
had indeed been deprived of the right to a jury trial. The court ruled that
the order of the Board as applied to the buyer was unconstitutional. Thejudgment of the district court was reversed and the order of the Board
was vacated.1 9
B. OPEN PRICE TERMS
Section 2.305 of the Code permits the parties to enter into a contract
for the sale of goods even though the price is left open.20 In such cases,
the price is a reasonable price at the time of delivery unless the parties
have agreed on a method by which the price is to be fixed. One such
method is for the parties to agree that the seller (or buyer) is to fix a
price. If this method is chosen, the price fixed must be one that is fixed
15. Propulsion Techs., Inc., 369 F.3d at 906.
16. 140 S.W.3d 826 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, pet. filed).
17. The Texas Department of Agriculture Produce Recovery Fund ("Fund") is a trust
fund established to reimburse persons for losses caused by the action of merchants or re-
tailers licensed under the Texas Agricultural Code. See TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN.§§ 103.001-.019 (Vernon 2004). The Board is charged with the duty to hear and evaluate
claims made against licensees. See TEX. AGRIC. CODE ANN. §§ 103.005-.008 (Vernon 2004).
18. McManus-Wyatt Produce Co., 140 S.W.3d at 827-29.
19. The court was careful to point out that its decision was limited to the constitution-
ality of the Board's order as applied to the buyer and that it was not making a decision
regarding the general constitutionality of the Fund or the authority of the Board. Id. at
833.
20. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE AN. § 2.305(a) (Vernon 1994).
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"in good faith."21 Good faith is defined as "honesty in fact and the obser-
vance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing," a combination
of both subjective and objective tests of good faith conduct.22
In Shell Oil Co. v. HRN, Inc.,23 several hundred gasoline station opera-
tors signed contracts to lease gas stations from Shell and to buy gasoline
at prices fixed by Shell. The dealers alleged that the prices fixed by Shell
put them at a competitive disadvantage and that Shell was attempting to
drive the dealers out of business so their stations could be converted to
company-owned stations that would be more profitable to Shell. Because
the price fixed by Shell was within the range of prices charged by other
refiners, the dealers did not contest the commercial reasonableness of the
price. They argued instead that Shell did not act in subjective good faith
because it had the motive to drive them out of business. The court of
appeals agreed with the dealers and held that merely because a price was
commercially reasonable, a seller might still violate the standard of good
faith conduct if the price was set with the motivation to harm a buyer.
24
The Texas Supreme Court rejected this argument, reasoning that the pur-
pose of the good faith standard in section 2.305(b) is to prevent discrimi-
natory pricing between similarly situated buyers, a situation that would
occur if, for example, Shell charged one price to some of the franchised
dealers, but charged a different price to other franchised dealers.2 5 Be-
cause all of the franchished dealers were charged the same commercially
reasonable price, there was no price discrimination and, therefore, no vio-
lation of the standards for either subjective or objective good faith.26 The
supreme court reversed the court of appeals and rendered a take nothing
judgment against the plaintiffs. 27
C. WARRANTIES
Perhaps the most significant decision under Chapter 2 reported during
the Survey period was Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray,28 a class ac-
tion brought by purchasers of Compaq computers who alleged that the
computers contained defective floppy disk controllers. While much of the
opinion discusses the interpretation of Rules 42(b)(2) and (b)(3) regard-
21. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.305(b) (Vernon 1994) provides, "A price to be
fixed by the seller or by the buyer means a price for him to fix in good faith."
22. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(b)(20) (Vernon Supp. 2004).
23. 144 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. 2004).
24. See HRN, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 102 S.W.3d 205 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2003), rev'd, 144 S.W.3d 429 (Tex. 2004) (discussed in Commercial Transactions-2004,
supra note 2, at 705).
25. Shell Oil Co., 144 S.W.3d at 437.
26. On this point, the Texas Surpeme Court rejected the market definition used by the
court of appeals which compared prices charged to the franchised dealers with prices
charged to jobbers, non-franchised dealers, and company-owned stores operated by other
refiners. As stated by the Texas Supreme Court, "Evidence that different prices are availa-
ble to different classes of trade is not evidence of bad faith under [s]ection 2.305." Shell
Oil Co., 144 S.W.3d at 438.
27. Id.
28. 135 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. 2004).
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SMU LAW REVIEW
ing class certification, 29 the interplay between class certification and war-
ranty law is of particular note. The trial court certified a nationwide class
of some 1.8 million purchasers of thirty-seven different models of Com-
paq Presario computers; this certification was upheld by the court of ap-
peals.30 The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that variations in the
warranty law of the several states made nationwide class certification im-
proper.31 It is this part of the opinion that is of special interest under
Chapter 2.
In this portion of the opinion, the supreme court stated, "While this
case involves a Uniform Commercial Code breach of express warranty
claim, it seems that "'the Uniform Commercial Code is not uniform
.... ,,32 The supreme court then described four areas of difference
among the states in their interpretation and application of the Code.33
Notice of Breach. Under section 2-607(3)(a) in the Official Text of the
Code, an aggrieved buyer is required to notify the seller of a breach or be
barred from any remedy. 34 The supreme court pointed out that there is a
split among the states as to whether notice by the buyer is sufficient if the
buyer notifies only the immediate seller or whether the buyer must also
notify remote sellers, such as the manufacturer who placed the goods in
the chain of distribution.35 The supreme court also noted that this split
sometimes exists within a single state, citing the Texas case of Wilcox v.
Hillcrest Memorial Park of Dallas36 as an example. 37
Reliance. Section 2-313(1)(a) in the Official Text provides that a seller
creates an express warranty when an affirmation of fact or promise, a
description of the goods, or a sample or model becomes "part of the basis
of the bargain. ' 38 The supreme court observed that the states tend to fall
into three categories in their interpretation of the meaning of "basis of
the bargain." Some states hold that this phrase requires reliance by the
buyer, others hold that no reliance is required, and still others have not
addressed the question.39
Remedies for Breach. The supreme court also noted variation among
the states regarding whether damages for breach of warranty are recover-
29. See TEX. R. Civ. P. 42(b)(2), (b)(3).
30. Compaq, 135 S.W.3d at 661-62 (describing the history of the case).
31. Id. at 661.
32. Id. at 673 (quoting Walsh v. Ford Motor Co., 807 F.3d 1000, 1016 (D.C. Cir. 1986)).
33. Id. at 674-81. In its discussion, the supreme court cited numerous cases from sev-
eral jurisdictions to illustrate the variation among the states. With a few exceptions, these
citations have not been repeated in this article.
34. Section 2-607(3)(a) in the Official Text was enacted in Texas as TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 2.607(c)(1) (Vernon 1994).
35. Compaq, 135 S.W.3d at 674.
36. 701 S.W.2d 842, 843 (Tex. 1986). Further discussion of Wilcox and notice of breach
may be found in Commercial Transactions-2004, supra note 3, at 709.
37. Compaq, 135 S.W.3d at 674 (citing Wilcox, 701 S.W.2d at 845).
38. Section 2-313(1)(a) in the Official Text was enacted in Texas as TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 2.313(a)(1) (Vernon 1994).
39. Compaq, 135 S.W.3d at 675-77.
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able for "unmanifested defects."'40 The supreme court found only a few
cases addressing this issue in the context of express warranties, but even
those few cases reached different results. Furthermore, the court found
that the law of most states (including Texas) was unclear as to whether
damages were recoverable for products that had not actually
malfunctioned.
41
Most Significant Relationship. The last area noted by the supreme court
as being problematic for purposes of nationwide class certification in an
express warranty case is the difference between the "appropriate rela-
tionship" test and the "most significant relationship" test. Both tests deal
with the choice of appropriate law to govern a dispute when there is no
choice of law clause in the agreement of the parties. The tests differ, how-
ever, in that the Code only requires that a transaction have an "appropri-
ate relation" to a given state to apply the law of that state (including the
provisions of the Code), while the general choice of law rule as contained
in the Restatement of Conflicts is directed toward choosing the law of the
jurisdiction that has the "most significant relationship" with a transac-
tion.42 The trial court had determined that Texas had the "most signifi-
cant relationship" to the computer sales because Compaq was
incorporated and headquartered in Texas. The supreme court ruled that
this was an abuse of discretion because the class members were domiciled
in all fifty states and the District of Columbia. Under the law of these
jurisdictions, the most significant relationship might well be the jurisdic-
tion where the purchaser was located rather than the jurisdiction where
the manufacturer was located.
43
The net result of the Texas Supreme Court's analysis was that nation-
wide class certification for breach of an express warranty claim was im-
proper under Rules 42(b)(2) and (b)(3) because questions of law
common to the members of the purported class did not predominate over
questions affecting individual members of the class. The class certification
40. Id. at 677-80.
41. Id. at 679.
42. Compare TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.301 (Vernon Supp. 2004), with RE-
STATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971). The supreme court did not
discuss the difference between the Official Text version of section 1-301(a) and the non-
uniform version of that section derived from section 1-105 in the former Official Text that
has been adopted in all but one of the jurisdictions that have enacted revised Article 1 of
the Code. See text accompanying note 1 (discussing the enactment of revised Article 1).
An interesting sidelight on the choice of law issue is that of the apparently missing choice
of law clause, which is almost a staple in sales contracts for consumer goods. No mention of
such a clause appears in the opinion and no such clause seems to have been raised by
either party. Given the opinion of the supreme court, a manufacturer of consumer prod-
ucts might have second thoughts about including a choice of law clause in its sales contracts
because choosing the law of a specific state to govern disputes would obviate the problem
of varying state laws that formed the basis for the denial of class certification in this case.
43. Compaq, 135 S.W.3d at 681. Obviously, each of these jurisdictions would have an




order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings.44
For slightly more than thirty years, warranty law in Texas has been in-
tertwined with the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act ("DTPA"). 45
This linkage has occurred because, since its inception, the DTPA has al-
lowed warranty claims as one of the causes of action for which relief may
be sought.46 The ability to assert warranty claims under the DTPA has led
to a complex interplay between the warranty provisions in the Code. In
PPG Industries, Inc. v. JMB/Houston Centers Partners L.P., the Texas Su-
preme Court addressed for the first time whether DTPA claims can be
assigned. 47 In 1989, the plaintiff purchased an office building that had
been built in 1978. As part of the sale, the building owner made a general
assignment of all warranties covering the building. Two years later, exten-
sive problems developed with the insulating window units that covered
the exterior of the building. The purchaser sued the window manufac-
turer for breach of warranty and for DTPA violations, obtaining a judg-
ment for approximately seventeen million dollars. The court of appeals
affirmed the judgment.48
Noting a split among the courts of appeals on the issue of assignability
of DTPA claims, the Texas Supreme Court held that DTPA claims are
generally not assignable. 49 In its holding, the court specifically added that
it was not deciding "whether DTPA claims survive to a consumer's heirs,
a related but sometimes distinct inquiry. '' 50 The court further stated:
[W]e also reserve for another day the assignment of claims that were
created within and could not be brought without the DTPA, such as
false going-out-of-business sales or price-gouging during a disaster.
Finally, our holding does not prohibit equitable assignments, such as
a contingent-fee interest assigned to a consumer's attorney.5 1
In contrast to the DTPA claims, the supreme court held that the war-
44. Id. In Vanderbilt Mortg. & Finan., Inc. v. Posey, 146 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.), decided shortly after Compaq was reported, the Texarkana Court
of Appeals stated, "While in the past it was permissible to postpone choice of law analysis
until after [class] certification, the Texas Supreme Court now requires performance of
choice of law analysis before a class is certified." Vanderbilt, 146 S.W.3d at 312 (citing
Compaq, 135 S.W.3d at 672).
45. The Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act [hereinafter DTPA] was enacted in the1973 Legislative Session and became effective on May 21, 1973. See Deceptive Trade Prac-
tices-Consumer Protection Act, 63rd Leg., R.S., ch. 143, § 1, 1973, Tex. Gen. Laws 322(codified at TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004-05)).
46. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (Vernon 2002) (providing that a con-
sumer may maintain an action for (1) false, misleading, or deceptive acts or practices enu-
merated in the DTPA itself, (2) breach of an express or implied warranty, (3) an
unconscionable action or course of action, and (4) use or employment of an act or practice
that violates Article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code).
47. 146 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. 2004).
48. Id. at 82-83.
49. Id. at 92.
50. Id. at 91.
51. Id. at 91-92 (internal footnotes omitted).
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ranty claims were assignable. 52 One of the warranty claims was based on
a five-year warranty contained in the contract under which the window
units had been sold when the building was constructed. The supreme
court ruled that this claim was barred by limitations because suit was
brought long after the five-year period expired.53 A second warranty
claim, however, was based on a statement in an advertisement by the
manufacturer that the window units had a twenty-year warranty. As to
this warranty, the supreme court held that the assignee was entitled to an
opportunity to prove that the twenty-year warranty was part of the bar-
gain for the purchase and installation of the window units.
54
The judgment of the lower court was reversed on the issue of the as-
signability of DTPA claims and on the claim based on the five-year war-
ranty. The claim based on the twenty-year warranty was remanded for
trial on the fact issue of whether that warranty was part of the basis of the
bargain for purchase of the windows.
55
As to warranty law itself, disclaiming warranties has become a complex
matter in Texas law and requires consideration of the source of the war-
ranty (Code or common law), the type of property being sold (goods, real
estate, or services), and the particular warranties being disclaimed. One
common thread, however, tends to run through this entire matter-a dis-
claimer must either be conspicuous or known to the buyer.
56
In Bynum v. Prudential Residential Service, L.P.,57 the Houston Court
of Appeals held that an inconspicuous "as is" clause was nonetheless ef-
fective because the buyers were sophisticated consumers with experience
in the purchase of real estate and they read the "as is" clause at the time
the agreement was signed. 58 The court held that the "as is" clause was
effective to disclaim warranties, and it also defeated the producing cause
element of the buyers' claims for DTPA violations and negligent misrep-
resentation. In the face of the "as is" clause, the buyers could not prove
that they relied on the representations of the seller or the real estate bro-
ker with whom the buyers dealt.
59
52. Id. at 92 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.210(b) (Vernon 1994 & Supp.
2004)).
53. Id. at 98. In reaching this conclusion, the supreme court rejected an argument that
the limitations period had been tolled by representations made by the manufacturer that
problems with the window units had been remedied.
54. Id. at 99-100.
55. Id. at 100.
56. There are two seminal cases on this issue. In Dresser Industries, Inc. v. Page Petro-
leum, Inc., 853 S.W.2d 505 (Tex. 1993), the Texas Supreme Court announced that the Code
definition of "conspicuous" contained in TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(10)
(Vernon 1994) (now TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(b)(10) (Vernon Supp. 2004))
would apply to contracts of all types, whether or not they were otherwise governed by the
Code. In Cate v. Dover Corp., 790 S.W.2d 559, 561-62 (Tex. 1990), the Texas Supreme
Court held that a disclaimer that was known to the buyer would be effective to disclaim
warranties even if the disclaimer was inconspicuous.
57. 129 S.W.3d 781 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
58. Id. at 789-90.
59. Id. at 796.
2005]
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D. GOOD FAITH PURCHASE
A buyer of goods may qualify as both a good faith purchaser under
Chapter 2 of the Code and as a buyer in the ordinary course of business
under Chapter 9.60 In both instances, the rights of the buyer may be
greater than those of the seller vis-a-vis third parties who assert claims to
the goods.61 While the basic rules are simple, application of these rules
becomes difficult if the goods are motor vehicles covered by a certificate
of title. The difficulty arises because the Texas Certificate of Title Act
provides that the sale of a vehicle is void if the certificate of title is not
transferred to the buyer at the time of sale.62 The Act also provides, how-
ever, that the Code preempts the Act when they conflict. 63 On several
occasions, Dallas Court of Appeals reasoned that if a sale is void unless
the certificate of title is transferred, there is no conflict between the Code
and the Act because no sale has occurred and the Code does not apply.64
Thus, because the Act controls, there is no need to refer to the provisions
of the Code.
In First National Bank of El Campo v. Buss, 65 a floor-plan financier
had a perfected security interest in a dealer's inventory of used cars. The
financier retained possession of the certificates of title for the cars. Sev-
eral buyers purchased cars from the dealer and completed applications
for title certificates. The dealer was to complete the application process
and have new certificates of title issued to the buyers. Before this process
was completed, the dealer defaulted on his loan and the financier de-
manded that the buyers return the vehicles. The buyers sought a declara-
tory judgment that their purchases gave them ownership of the vehicles.
The financier counterclaimed, asserting that its security interest was the
superior claim. The trial court ruled in favor of the buyers.66
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals acknowledged the line of "no-
conflict-if-the-sale-is-void" cases, but reasoned that the legislative policy
underlying the preemption provision in the Certificate of Title Act was
better served by applying the Code provisions instead of the Act. In the
60. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.320 (Vernon 2002); TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 2.403 (Vernon 1994).
61. For example, a seller may have acquired goods under circumstances that gave the
seller only a voidable title to the goods. In this case, a good faith purchaser acquires title to
the goods superior to that of the seller and would be protected from claims by the third
party who provided the seller with the goods. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.403(a)(Vernon 1994). Alternatively, a seller may have granted a security interest in the goods to a
lender. In this case, a buyer in the ordinary course of business takes the goods free of the
security interest, even if the security interest is perfected. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 9.320 (Vernon 2002).
62. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 501.073 (Vernon 1999).
63. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 501.005 (Vernon 1999).
64. See, e.g., Gallas v. Car Biz, Inc., 914 S.W.2d 592, 594-95 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1995,
writ denied); Morey v. Page, 802 S.W.2d 779, 783-84 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ);
Pfluger v. Colquitt, 620 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The
Fifth Circuit has reached a similar result. See Bank One Texas, N.A. v. Arcadia Fin. Ltd.,
219 F.3d 494, 498 (5th Cir. 2000).
65. 143 S.W.3d 915 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. filed).
66. Id. at 916-18.
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court's opinion, this promoted the goal of uniformity mandated by the
Code, complied with the legislative history of the Act, and was consistent
with earlier cases decided by the court. Judgment in favor of the buyers
was affirmed. 67 A petition for review has been filed, giving the Texas Su-
preme Court an opportunity to clarify the contradictory approaches cur-
rently existing in Texas regarding the relationship between the Code and
the Certificate of Title Act.
Park Cities L.P. v. Transpo Funding Corp.68 also involved the sale of
vehicles without the transfer of certificates of title. The case differed,
however, in that the parties, both of whom were car dealers, dealt with
each other in the past. Under their practice, the seller delivered cars to
the buyer for inspection. After determining which cars the buyer wanted,
the buyer wrote checks in the name of the seller and retained the checks
until the seller delivered the certificates of title. On this particular occa-
sion, the intended buyer never voluntarily delivered the checks to the
seller; instead, the seller apparently stole the checks and never delivered
the titles. A few weeks later, the seller used the same cars as collateral for
a loan and delivered the titles to the financier as part of the transaction.
When the seller's dealings came to light, the alleged buyer and the finan-
cier each sought a declaratory judgment for ownership of the vehicles.
There was no evidence in the record that the seller paid for the vehicles,
possessed the titles, or had authority to sell the cars at the time he deliv-
ered them to the purported buyer for inspection. Furthermore, the checks
were stolen by the seller; this made it difficult to find that a "sale" had
taken place. Under these circumstances, the Dallas Court of Appeals af-
firmed the decision of the trial court in favor of the financier who actually
obtained the titles as part of its loan transaction with the seller.
69
E. REMEDIES
Arbitration has become a common method of dispute resolution in
cases involving the sale of goods and services. 70 While public policy fa-
vors arbitration and challenges to the enforceability of arbitration clauses
often fail, a seller (who is usually the drafter of sales contracts) must still
avoid overbroad clauses. In In re Palm Harbor Homes, Inc.,71 the Hous-
ton Court of Appeals held an arbitration clause to be unconscionable
67. Id. at 924.
68. 131 S.W.3d 654 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, pet. denied).
69. Id. at 660. In addition to discussing the problematic nature of the "sale," the court
also noted that the evidence did not support the buyer's arguments that the financier en-
trusted the cars to the seller or gave the seller authority to sell them because the seller did
not approach the financier until after the seller delivered the cars to the buyer. Id. at 660-
61.
70. See, e.g., In re FirstMerit Bank, 52 S.W.3d 749 (Tex. 2001) (holding an arbitration
clause enforceable against buyers of mobile home); In re American Homestar of Lancas-
ter, Inc., 50 S.W.3d 480 (Tex. 2001) (holding an arbitration clause enforceable against pur-
chasers of manufactured home); In re Rangel, 45 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. App.-Waco 2001, no
pet.) (holding an arbitration was proper in a contract for extermination services).




where the clause required the purchasers of a mobile home to submit any
claims to binding arbitration, but contained a provision allowing the man-
ufacturer, any lender, or any mortgagee to "opt-out" of arbitration. The
court reasoned that the contract lacked mutuality of remedy because of
the unlimited opt-out provision. Additionally, the court found disparity
in bargaining power between the seller and the purchasers; the purchas-
ers "were not afforded a meaningful opportunity to negotiate a fair and
mutually binding opt-out provision. ' ' 72 Because the clause and the cir-
cumstances surrounding the making of the contract involved both proce-
dural and substantive unconscionability, the court upheld the decision of
the trial court that the clause was unenforceable. 73
Although the Code permits specific performance in limited circum-
stances for breach of a sales contract, damages are the more common
remedy.74 In Ford Motor Co. v. Cooper,75 a car buyer sought to recover
damages for breach of warranty and for alleged DTPA misrepresenta-
tions. The Texarkana Court of Appeals held that an owner can testify as
to the market value of the goods, but found that, in this case, the owner's
testimony pertained to the intrinsic value of the goods to him and not the
market value. Because there was no evidence of market value, judgment
in favor of the buyer was reversed. However, because there was evidence
that the seller breached the agreement and engaged in deceptive prac-
tices, the court granted a new trial to give the plaintiff an opportunity to
offer proper proof of damages. 76
The basic limitation period for breach of a contract for the sale of
goods is four years from the time the cause of action accrues. 77 A breach
of warranty occurs upon tender of delivery of the goods unless the war-
ranty explicitly extends to future performance. 78 By agreement, the par-
ties can shorten a limitations period to a period of not less than one
year. 79
In Conquest Drilling Fluids, Inc. v. Tri-Flo International, Inc.,80 the
Beaumont Court of Appeals addressed the question of when tender oc-
curred for purposes of determining when the four year limitations period
72. Id. at 646.
73. Id. at 645-46.
74. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.716 (Vernon 1994 & Supp. 2004) allows a buyer
to seek specific performance where the goods "are unique or in other proper circum-
stances." Although not denominated as such, a seller's action for the price under TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 2.709 (Vernon 1994) is the functional equivalent of an action for
specific performance because payment of the price is the buyer's performance under a
sales contract.
75. 125 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet. h.).
76. Id. at 795, 805.
77. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(a) (Vernon 1994).
78. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(b) (Vernon 1994). As to a warranty that
extends to future performance, see PPG Indus., Inc. v. JMB/Houston Centers Partners
L.P., 146 S.W.3d 79 (Tex. 2004). PPG Indus. is also discussed at note 40 (buyer asserted a
breach of warranty claim based on an advertisement by the seller that the goods were
warranted for twenty years).
79. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725(a) (Vernon 1994).
80. 137 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 2004, no pet. h.).
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began to run on a claim for breach of express warranty. The seller re-
quested a jury instruction paralleling the definition of tender of delivery
contained in section 2.503, but the trial court failed to submit the re-
quested instruction.81 On appeal, the court approved the instruction, re-
versed the trial court, and remanded the case for trial to determine the
factual issue of when tender of delivery occurred.
82
In Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Benchmark Electronics, Inc.,83 a buyer and
seller entered into a contracted for the seller to manufacture computer
motherboards for the buyer using chipsets supplied by the buyer. Under
their arrangement, the seller was to bill the buyer for delivered
motherboards and the buyer would periodically send a "debit memo" to
the seller for reimbursement for the chipsets the buyer supplied. The con-
tract contained a two-year limitations period for claims arising under it,
including claims arising from the failure of the buyer to pay the seller's
invoices for motherboards. The contract was silent, however, as to the
time period for the seller to reimburse the buyer under the debit memos.
When the parties decided to end their relationship, the buyer sent a
final debit memo to the seller. The seller failed to make payment on this
final memo and the buyer sued. The seller argued that more than two
years had passed since the date of the memo and the claim was barred by
the contractual limitations period. The Houston Court of Appeals dis-
agreed, holding that the two-year limitations period did not apply be-
cause the contract was silent with regard to the time for payment of the
debit memos.84 Summary judgment in favor of the seller was reversed
and the case was remanded.85
III. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS AND
BANK TRANSACTIONS
A. ENFORCEMENT AND DEFENSES
Defenses to enforcement of a negotiable instrument fall into two broad
categories: (1) defenses that are viable against any person seeking to en-
force an instrument, including holders in due course, and (2) defenses
that can be asserted only against persons who do not qualify as holders in
81. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.503 (Vernon 1994) provides:
(a) Tender of delivery requires that the seller put and hold conforming
goods at the buyer's disposition and give the buyer any notification rea-
sonably necessary to enable him to take delivery. The manner, time and
place for tender are determined by the agreement and in particular
(1) tender must be at a reasonable hour, and if it is of goods they must
be kept available for the period reasonably necessary to enable the
buyer to take possession; but
(2) unless otherwise agreed the buyer must furnish facilities reasonably
suited to the receipt of the goods.
82. Conquest, 137 S.W.3d at 308.
83. 142 S.W.3d 554 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied).
84. Id. at 557-59, 562.
85. Id. at 565.
20051
SMU LAW REVIEW
due course. 86 Defenses in the former category are often termed "real de-
fenses." Defenses in the latter category are generally known as "personal
defenses."
In Bassett v. American National Bank,87 a bank obtained summary
judgment against the makers of a promissory note. On appeal, the makers
contended that their defenses of lack of consideration and conditional
delivery (both of which are personal defenses) precluded enforcement of
the note. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that, while the makers
were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law, they had produced suffi-
cient summary judgment evidence on these defenses to raise issues of
material fact. The case was remanded for trial on these issues.88
In CSH Restaurant Group, Inc. v. General Electric Capital Business As-
set Funding Corp.,89 summary judgment in favor of the holder of two
promissory notes was reversed because the holder failed to show the
amount due and owing on the notes. Internal discrepancies in the sum-
mary judgment proof submitted by the holder made it impossible to de-
termine the balance due on the notes; therefore, the case was remanded
for trial on this issue. 90
In Lee v. Martin Marietta Materials Southwest, Ltd.,91 the plaintiff sued
to recover the amount due under a guaranty. 92 The guarantor argued that
the guaranty was not enforceable because it was issued in favor of the
plaintiff's predecessor and not in favor of the plaintiff. Under the rule of
strict interpretation as applied to guaranties, the guarantor contended
that he was not liable for debts incurred by the principal debtor to the
plaintiff.93 While conceding this general rule, the San Antonio Court of
Appeals determined that the plaintiff was in fact the same entity because
it existed merely by a change of organizational structure and a name
change, not by creation of a new entity. The court distinguished the situa-
tion relied upon by the guarantor where two companies merged to form a
new corporation that did not previously exist. Because the plaintiff re-
mained the same company, albeit with a new organizational form and a
new name, the guarantor remained liable on his guaranty. 94
In Suttles v. Thomas Bearden Co.,95 the Houston Court of Appeals ad-
dressed the question of whether a signature in the form:
86. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.305(a)(1)-(2) (Vernon 2002).
87. 145 S.W.3d 692 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2004, no pet. h.).
88. Id.
89. 145 S.W.3d 822 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet. h.).
90. Id.
91. 141 S.W.3d 719 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2004, no pet. h.).
92. Under Chapter 3 of the Code, guarantors may be liable by placing a signature on
an instrument as an accomodation party or by signing a separate contract of guaranty. See
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.419, 3.605 (Vernon 2002).
93. The law generally requires that the terms of a guaranty must be strictly followed
and may not be extended beyond its precise terms. See McKnight v. Virginia Mirror Co.,
463 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tex. 1971).
94. Lee, 141 S.W.3d at 721-22.
95. 152 S.W.3d 607 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 22, 2004, no pet. h.).
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TS Clare, Inc., General Partner
Tracy Suttles, President
/s/Tracy Suttles
made Tracy Suttles liable as a co-maker of the note. When the note de-
faulted, the payee sued both the TS Clare company and Suttles. The trial
court granted summary judgment for the payee and the defendants
appealed. 96
Suttles contended that the trial court erred because the form of his
signature showed unambiguously that he had signed in a representative
capacity. The payee argued that the judgment of the court below was cor-
rect because the signature was ambiguous as to Suttle's personal liability
for three reasons.
First, the body of the note referred to multiple borrowers and provided
for joint and several liability among the borrowers. The court rejected
this argument on the ground that, "we look only to the 'form of the signa-
ture' to insure that the signature, itself, unambiguously shows representa-
tive capacity."'97
Second, the payee contended that identifying himself as "President"
did not indicate that Suttles was signing only to show who placed the
signature of the company on the note; instead, the payee argued, he
should have preceded his signature with the word "by." The court re-
jected this argument as well on the ground that section 3.402(b)(1) of the
Code does not require "an obsequious adherence to a specific signature
form."'98 The court concluded that "a preposition was not required to
show Suttles's representative capacity; it was enough that the signature
identify TS-Clare, Suttles, and the capacity in which Suttles signed on
behalf of TS-Clare."
99
Third, the payee urged that a handwritten amendment in a blank space
at the bottom of the note modifying the interest terms and the date of
one installment payment that Suttles signed without identifying himself as
President made his capacity ambiguous. The court found this argument to
be without merit, reasoning that placement of the signatures on the
amendment merely showed that the amendment was authorized and did
not make Suttles individually liable nor did it create ambiguity with re-
spect to his signature in the body of the note.100
The court administered its coup de grace by holding that, as a matter of
law, Suttles was not individually liable on the note and the trial court had
erred in granting summary judgment against him.10 1
The importance of this case is its unequivocal holding that a signature
in the form, "Richard Roe, John Doe, Agent," insulates the agent from
96. Id. at 610.
97. Id. at 613.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 613-14.
101. Id. at 614.
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personal liability regardless of the intention of the parties, even when the
action is between the immediate parties to the instrument. An ironic as-
pect of this case is that while the court deplores "obsequious adherence
to a specific signature form," it seems to have adopted a rule that is
equally obsequious to another signature form. 102
In Alma Group, L.L.C. v. Palmer,103 the maker of a note contended
that the FDIC had improperly transferred the note to an assignee in vio-
lation of an anti-assignment provision contained in an underlying agree-
ment between the maker and the FDIC. The note itself did not contain an
anti-assignment clause and did not reference the underlying agreement.
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that under the Financial Insti-
tutions Reforms, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 ("FIRREA"),
the assignment was valid because FIRREA preempts state law and allows
assignees of the FDIC to become holders in due course even without
technical compliance with the requirements of state law. 104
In Southwest Bank v. Information Support Concepts, Inc.,105 an em-
ployee stole 183 checks that were payable to her employer over a period
of eighteen months. She deposited them into her personal account at a
bank where the employer did not have an account. There was no in-
dorsement by the employer, whether real or forged, on any of the checks.
The employer sued the depositary bank for conversion under section
3.420 of the Code. 106 The bank argued the employer was contributorily
negligent by failing to adequately supervise the employee, that the em-
ployer had assumed the risk of the employee's dishonesty, and that the
employer failed to mitigate damages. The bank sought to join the em-
ployee in the suit as a responsible third party under the terms of the gen-
102. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.402 (Vernon 2002) is derived from the former
section 3.403. Acts 1967, 60th Leg., p. 2343, ch. 785, § 1, amended by Acts 1995, 74th Leg.,
R.S., ch. 921, § 1, 1995 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 921. Under the former version, the intent of the
parties controlled in actions between the immediate parties to an instrument if a signature
was ambiguous; intent, of course, would be a question of fact.
A careful reading of Official Comment 3 to the former section 3.403 and Official Com-
ment 2 to the current section 3.402 indicates that the drafters omitted any discussion of a
signature in the form "Richard Roe, John Doe Agent." The closest the current Comment
comes to dealing with a similar situation is the parenthetical statement that a signature in
the form ("P, by A, Treasurer") is a signature that unambiguously shows "A" signed in a
representative capacity.
Based on its interpretation of the current section 3.402, the court in Suttles essentially
converts what was a question of fact into a question of law in its treatment of the word
"by" as "obsequious adherence" to the use of a preposition.
103. 143 S.W.3d 840 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2004, pet. denied).
104. Id. at 845. In reaching this conclusion, the court cited Jackson v. Thweatt, 883
S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1994) (holding that preemptive effect of FIRREA allowed assignee to
use six-year limitations period of federal law instead of four-year limitations period of state
law for enforcement of notes) and Bailey, Vaught, Robertson & Co. v. Remington Inv.,
Inc., 888 S.W.2d 860 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, no writ) (holding that assignee could en-
force note at a reasonable rate of interest even though note no longer stated a "sum cer-
tain" as required by state law because prime rate could no longer be determined due to
bank failure).
105. 149 S.W.3d 104 (Tex. 2004).
106. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.420 (Vernon 2002).
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eral proportionate responsibility statute.10 7 Both the trial court and the
court of appeals held that the employee could not be joined because
Chapter 3 does not provide for a comparative allocation of responsibility
in conversion cases.
The Texas Supreme Court reviewed the legislative history of the
amendments made in Texas during the 1995 legislative session, particu-
larly the history relating to the comparative fault provisions in sections
3.405, 3.406, and 4.406.108 The supreme court rejected an argument that
the general statute should apply because Chapter 3 provides a compara-
tive fault rule for forged endorsement cases, but does not have a similar
rule for conversion cases.109 Finding no Texas cases on point, the su-
preme court discussed and approved, the decision in John Hancock Fi-
nancial Services, Inc. v. Old Kent Bank,110 in which the Sixth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the Michigan Tort Reform Act did not apply
to a conversion claim brought under section 3-406. Emphasizing that the
underlying purposes and policies of the UCC include a directive "to make
uniform the law among the various jurisdictions," the supreme court
stated, "Were we to impose Texas's proportionate responsibility scheme
on Revised Article 3, parties litigating UCC-based conversion claims in
Texas would face a unique liability scheme, overriding the UCC's express
purpose of furthering uniformity among the states." ' a The supreme court
held that the trial court and the court of appeals properly denied the
bank's motion to join the employee as a responsible third party because
the UCC provides the rules for loss allocation in a negotiable instruments
107. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.004 (Vernon Supp. 2004).
108. The Official Text of Article 3 was substantially revised in 1990. See U.C.C. Rept.
Serv., Revised Article 3 Negotiable Instruments: 1990 Official Text with Comments 1-139
(West 2005). These amendments were adopted in Texas in 1995. See Act of May 28, 1995,
74th Leg., R.S., ch. 921, secs. 1-2 (codified as TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.101 -.605
(Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2004)).
109. 149 S.W.3d at 108-09. On this point, the supreme court said:
[Amici] assert that Revised Article 3 provides its own comparative negli-
gence scheme in the case of forged endorsements but is silent on missing
endorsements, such as the one in this case. Accordingly, amici contend that
chapter 33 is uniquely applicable to missing endorsement cases. If that were
the case, however, the thief's liability would be submitted to the jury in a
missing endorsement case but not in a forged endorsement case. Certainly, a
bank should bear more culpability in the former situation than the latter, but
under the result proposed by amici, the opposite would be true. A bank that
paid a check bearing absolutely no endorsement could escape liability if the
jury determined the thief was at fault, while a bank that paid on a forged but
seemingly genuine endorsement would not be able to submit the thief's lia-
bility to the jury. A more reasonable construction is that the Texas Legisla-
ture and the UCC drafters considered and rejected comparative fault in
missing endorsement cases, but elected to permit it in forged endorsement
ones.... We should not disturb that decision by applying Chapter 33 to those
UCC-based conversion claims for which the drafters and the Legislature
chose not to apportion responsibility.
Id. (emphasis in original).
110. 346 F.3d 727 (6th Cir. 2003).




IV. LETTL'ERS OF CREDIT
In Sava Gumarska in Kemijsk Industria v. Advanced Polymer Sciences,
Inc.,113 the beneficiary under a standby letter of credit attempted to draw
on the credit after the account party allegedly failed to fulfill its obliga-
tions on the underlying contract. The trial court enjoined the issuer from
honoring the letter of credit and ultimately held that the letter of credit
was void. In a cross-action by the account party against the beneficiary,
the account party prevailed. The beneficiary appealed.
The Dallas Court of Appeals noted that under the "independence prin-
ciple" applicable to letters of credit, the obligation of an issuer of a letter
of credit is independent of any underlying dispute between an account
party and a beneficiary. 114 Unless there is material fraud by the benefici-
ary that vitiates the entire transaction, an injunction should not issue
against payment of a letter of credit. Because the actions of the benefici-
ary did not rise to the level of material fraud, the trial court should not
have found the letter of credit to be void. However, because the claim by
the account party against the beneficiary on the underlying contract had
been adjudicated in the same action, with judgment in favor of the ac-
count party on its contract claim, the error was moot because the benefi-
ciary would not be entitled to retain any of the proceeds of the letter of
credit even if payment had been made. 115
V. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. CREATION OF SECURITY INTERESTS
In Baldwin v. Castro County Feeders I, Ltd.,116 the South Dakota Su-
preme Court addressed two principal questions. First, was the description
of collateral in a security agreement sufficient to create a security interest
in the collateral? Second, should an arbitration clause requiring the par-
ties to arbitrate disputes in Amarillo, Texas be enforced?
112. Id. at 110. Recognizing that the comparative fault provisions in Chapter 3 and the
general proportionate responsibility statute were both adopted in the same legislative ses-
sion, the supreme court stated its reasoning as follows:
UCC Revised Article 3, as adopted in Texas, represents a comprehensive
legislative fault scheme singularly applicable to claims involving negotiable
instruments. Its provisions are more specific than Chapter 33, and they were
adopted by the same Legislature that amended Chapter 33 to provide for
responsible third party liability. We conclude that the Legislature did not in-
tend to upset the UCC's carefully balanced liability provisions by applying
Chapter 33 to a UCC-based conversion claim. To hold otherwise would ig-
nore the UCC itself and thwart its underlying purpose.
Id. at 111.
113. 128 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2004, no pet.).
114. Id. at 318-19 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.103(d) (Vernon 2002 &
Supp. 2004)). A leading case discussing and applying the independence priniciple is Phi-
lipp Bros., Inc. v. Oil Country Specialists, Ltd., 787 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. 1990).
115. Sava Gumarska, 128 S.W.3d at 319-20.
116. 2004 SD 43, 678 N.W.2d 796.
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Regarding the first question, the security agreement defined "collat-
eral" as being "'[A]ll of Feeder's interest in farm products, limited to
livestock ... such livestock being specifically located in Lot(s) # __ at
Castro County Feeders, I, Ltd., Hart, Castro County, Texas. ' 117 Because
the blank for lot numbers was not filled in, the debtor contended the
description was inadequate. The South Dakota Supreme Court held that
a description of the collateral by category was sufficient under section 9-
108 of the South Dakota Code since both farm products and livestock
were defined terms under the Code. 118 The South Dakota Supreme Court
also stated that it was reasonable for the parties to omit the lot numbers
because the security interest attached to the cattle upon delivery to the
feedlot complex and the cattle were not usually located in one of Castro
County's lots when they were sold. 119
In response to the second question, the South Dakota Supreme Court
found that the arbitration clause was clear and unambiguous. Arbitration
of the right to proceeds of the collateral (the cattle having been sold) was
ordered to be held in Amarillo in accordance with the agreement of the
parties.' 20
B. ASSIGNMENT OF RIGHTS
Under section 9.406, an account debtor may continue to pay an as-
signor and discharge the account debtor's obligation under a security
agreement until notice is received from the assignee that the amount due
has been assigned and that future payments are to be made to the as-
signee.' 21 Obviously, documented receipt of notice is ideal. Unfortu-
nately, reality sometimes falls short of this goal as occurred in First
Capital Corp. v. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. 122
In First Capital, the assignee alleged that it had given both written and
oral notice to the account debtor. However, the written notice was sent to
a different entity than that required by the invoices. Furthermore, the
oral notice, if any, was given to an employee of the account debtor whose
duties consisted of loading and unloading shipments and did not include
transmission of notices about assignments. Because the written notice
was sent to the wrong entity, and the giving of oral notice was disputed,
the court concluded, as a matter of law, that the assignee "had no com-
munications with [account debtor's] employees that constitute effective
117. 2004 SD 43 at **8, 678 N.W.2d at 799.
118. 2004 SD 43 at **10, 678 N.W.2d at 800-01 (citing S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 57A-9-
108(b)(2) which is identical to TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.108(b)(2) (Vernon
2002)). The definition of "farm products" includes "livestock" under both S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 57A-9-102(34) and TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.102(a)(34) (Vernon 2002 &
Supp. 2004).
119. Baldwin, 2004 SD 43 at **11, 678 N.W.2d at 801.
120. 2004 SD 43 at **15, 678 N.W.2d at 802.
121. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.406 (Vernon 2002).
122. First Capital Corp. v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., No. 3:03-CV-214-M, 2004 WL 718975
(N.D. Tex. March 31, 2004).
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notice under the UCC of an assignment.., of the invoices.' 23 Summary
judgment was granted in favor of the defendant account parties.
C. ENFORCEMENT OF SECURITY INTERESTS
In Mehan v. Wamco XXVIII, Ltd.,124 a secured party had a priority
security interest in inventory. The inventory, however, was located on
property that had been leased by the debtor, and the lessor refused to
give the secured party access to the premises to repossess the collateral or
to sell in it place. The secured party sought a declaration that it had a first
priority in the inventory and an order that it be permitted to sell the in-
ventory on the property where it was located. 125
The lessor defended on the ground that the secured party had construc-
tively trespassed on the property by failing to remove the inventory
within a reasonable time, thereby depriving the lessor of the use of the
property. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals rejected this argument, stat-
ing that it could find no authority indicating that a secured party commits
a trespass by failing to foreclose or repossess collateral located on real
property owned by a third party. 126
The court noted that section 9.609 of the Code permits a secured party
to resort to judicial process to aid of repossession and upheld the order of
the trial court that the secured party be granted access to prepare the
inventory for sale and to sell it on the premises.127 The court also upheld
two trial court rulings that the secured party pay rent to the lessor for its
entry on the property and that any inventory left on the property after
the sale would be deemed abandoned to the lessor.12
8
Section 9.609 also permits a secured party to use self-help repossession
to recover collateral after a debtor defaults.129 Of course, this presup-
poses that the collateral can be found. In First Valley Bank of Los Fresnos
v. Martin,a30 a bank and a borrower had a falling out after the bank setoff
one of the borrower's deposits against the borrower's defaulted cattle
loan. The borrower subsequently hired an attorney who sent a letter to
the bank indicating three ranches where the collateral-seventy-five head
of cattle-could be located. As described by the Texas Supreme Court,
the ranches "covered more than 250 square miles of rough country and
contained skittish cattle belonging to many owners, so those belonging to
a particular owner could not be identified except by scouring the whole
123. Id. at *3. Revised TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.202 (Vernon Supp. 2004)
restates the provisions concerning the giving and receiving of notices required by various
provisions in the Code. With the advent of electronic communication, some thought
should be given to regarding how to verify the receipt of notices, particularly if given in
electronic form.
124. 138 S.W.3d 415 (Tex. App-Fort Worth 2004, no pet. h.).
125. Id. at 416-17.
126. Id. at 417.
127. Id. at 418 (citing TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 9.609 (Vernon 2002)).
128. Id. at 419-20.
129. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 9.609(a)(1) (Vernon 2002).
130. 144 S.W.3d 466 (Tex. 2004).
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area and corralling them all.' 31 The bank was able to locate only twenty
of the cattle. Frustrated by this turn of events, the bank complained to the
sheriff's department and a deputy sheriff tried his luck at finding the cat-
tle; no more could be found. The deputy filed a report with the district
attorney and the debtor was eventually indicted for hindering a secured
creditor. 132 The indictment was later dismissed. In an action by the bank
to recover the deficiency, the borrower counterclaimed on several theo-
ries, including malicious prosecution. The jury found in favor of the bank
in the amount of $50,000 on its deficiency claim, but also found in favor of
the borrower in the amount of $18,000,000, including punitive damages,
on his claims for malicious prosecution, fraud, and loss of credit reputa-
tion. The court of appeals affirmed recovery on the malicious prosecution
claim, but reversed on the fraud and loss of credit reputation claims, re-
sulting in the reduction of damages to an amount of $4.33 million. 133
The Texas Supreme Court, the supreme court reviewed the statutory
elements for a charge of hindering a secured creditor and found that the
borrower had admitted each of the necessary elements at trial. The su-
preme court then reasoned that,
When the objective elements of a crime reasonably appear to have
been completed, a private citizen has no duty to inquire whether the
suspect has some alibi or explanation before filing charges. Accord-
ingly, as a matter of law, [the borrower] cannot establish the absence
of probable cause, as he must do to prove malicious prosecution. 134
The judgment for malicious prosecution was reversed, thereby avoiding
any liability on the part of the bank, and judgment was affirmed in favor
of the bank on its $50,000 deficiency claim. 135
Al Gailani v. Riyad Bank, Houston Agency136 is further proof that the
wheels of justice can move exceeding slow. 137 In its latest iteration, the El
Paso Court of Appeals addressed the question of whether a secured party
properly conducted a foreclosure sale of accounts pledged as collateral
for a loan. The case arose before the effective date of revised Chapter 9
of the Code, therefore the court applied the law under the former Chap-
131. Id. at 469.
132. Id. The Texas Penal Code makes it a criminal offense for a debtor to remove,
conceal, or sell collateral with an intent to appropriate the collateral or its proceeds. See
TEX. PEN. CODE ANN. § 32.33 (Vernon 2003).
133. First Valley Bank, 144 S.W.3d at 468. The court of appeals reversed the judgment
on claims for damage to credit reputation and fraud, the court reduced the amount of
punitive damages. See First Valley Bank of Los Fresnos v. Martin, 55 S.W.3d 172, 194 (Tex.
App.-Corpus Christi 2001), rev'd, 144 S.W.3d 466 (Tex. 2004). The decision by the court
of appeals is discussed in John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, 55 SMU L. REV. 747,
772-73 (2002).
134. First Valley Bank, 144 S.W.3d at 470.
135. Id. at 472.
136. 144 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2003, pet. denied).
137. The case first appeared in the reports in 2000. See Al Gailani v. Riyad Bank,
Houston Agency, 22 S.W.3d 560 (Tex. App.-E1 Paso 2000). It was reversed and re-
manded in 2001 by Al Gailani v. Riyad Bank, Houston Agency, 61 S.W.3d 353, 357 (Tex.
2001), and reappeared on December 29, 2003 as Al Gailani, 144 S.W.3d at 1. The decisions
at earlier stages of the case are discussed in Krahmer, supra note 129, at 773-74.
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ter 9. The court required a secured party to prove that the disposition of
collateral was accomplished in a commercially reasonable manner if the
debtor put the matter in issue. 138
The accounts in question had a face value of two million dollars and
had been generated in transactions with companies conducting business
in Saudi Arabia. Notice of the sale was posted in the courthouse and pub-
lished twice in a newspaper about ten days before the sale was held. The
secured party, who was the only bidder at the foreclosure sale, purchased
the accounts for ten dollars. The court held that the sale had been inade-
quately advertised, particularly where contrary evidence indicated that no
effort was made to reach Saudi investors, who were the most likely audi-
ence to have an interest in purchasing the accounts. 139 The secured party
argued that because the loan had been made in Texas, there was no re-
quirement that publicity be given to persons outside Texas. The court re-
jected this argument, noting that the secured party had cited no authority
for this proposition and the court was unaware of any such authority.'
40
The secured party also argued that proper advertising of the sale was ir-
relevant because the records documenting the accounts had been de-
stroyed in a fire and the accounts were, therefore, worthless. The court
agreed there was evidence that some of the records had been destroyed,
but there was also evidence that not all of the records had been de-
stroyed. In addition, there was an affidavit from one of the account debt-
ors acknowledging the debt and proposing a payment plan. Under these
circumstances, the accounts could not be declared worthless as a matter
of law.141 Summary judgment in favor of the secured party was reversed
and the case remanded for further proceedings. 1
42
Although Gailani was decided under the former Chapter 9 by applying
the rules of pleading and proof announced in Greathouse v. Charter Na-
tional Bank-Southwest,143 it should be noted that similar rules have now
been incorporated in revised Chapter 9 in section 9.626.144
138. Al Gailani, 144 S.W.3d at 3. Revised Chapter 9 was adopted in Texas during the
1999 legislative session with an effective date of July 1, 2001. See Act of June 18, 1999, 76th
Leg., R.S., ch. 414, § 1.01, 1999 Tex. Gen. Laws 2639.
139. Al Gailani, 144 S.W.3d at 3.
140. Id. at 4.
141. Id. at 5.
142. Id.
143. 851 S.W.2d 173, 176-77 (Tex. 1992). Prior to the decision in Greathouse, there was
uncertainty as to whether the secured party or the debtor had the burden of pleading and
proving the commercial reasonableness (or unreasonableness) of a foreclosure sale. Nu-
merous cases illustrating this uncertainty are collected in the opinion.
144. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.626(a)(1)-(2) (Vernon 2002).
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